Assistant Professor of Finance
Finance and Managerial Economics
The School of Management, SM31
The University of Texas at Dallas
800 West Campbell Road
Richardson, Texas 75080
"Financing Constraints and Workplace Safety" (with Jonathan Cohn)
"The Costs of Closing Failed Banks: A Structural Estimation of Regulatory Incentives" (with Ari Kang and Richard Lowery)
We estimate a dynamic model of the decision to close a troubled bank. Regulators trade off an aversion to closing banks against the risk that allowing a bank to continue will raise the eventual costs to the deposit insurance fund. Using a conditional choice probability approach, we estimate the costs associated with closing banks, both in direct costs to the insurance fund and in other costs perceived by regulators, either social or personal. We find that delayed closures were driven by a desire to defer costs, an aversion to closing the largest and smallest troubled banks, and political influence.
"How Do Employees Fare in Leveraged Buyouts? Evidence from Workplace Safety Records" (with Jonathan Cohn and Nicole Nestoriak)
This paper studies the impact of leveraged buyouts (LBOs) on workplace injury risk. Injury rates decrease substantially after LBOs of public firms, both in absolute terms and relative to controls. These changes persist for several years post-buyout. Cross-sectional analysis suggests that alleviation of public market pressure to behave myopically contributes to the decrease in injury risk after LBOs of public firms. The reduction in injury risk, for which employees demand a compensating wage differential, may partly explain the recently-documented fall in employee earnings after public firm LBOs. Injury rates increase after LBOs of private firms, though from substantially lower pre-LBO levels.
"The Trust Alternative" (with Indraneel Chakraborty and Alessio Saretto)
We propose an alternative market design to the current credit ratings industrial organization. An issuer delegates a pass-through non-monitoring trust to acquire a rating report from credit ratings agencies (CRAs). The trust pays outcome contingent fees, which guarantee truth-telling and therefore eliminate ratings inflation. Moreover, because the trust acts as an intermediary, it also eliminates the ability of issuers to shop different CRAs for better ratings. Voluntary participation to the trust mechanism from both issuers and CRAs is guaranteed by the surplus generated by improved ratings efficiency. Ultimately, the trust can improve social welfare by inducing more effort, especially when CRAs are competing over the accuracy of ratings. Differently from up front fees, in fact, payments contingent upon outcomes can be properly designed to increase the CRA’s effort to produce more precise signals.
"Measuring Contract Completeness: A Text Based Analysis of Loan Agreements" (with Bernhard Ganglmair)
Contractual incompleteness is one of the core principles in much of corporate finance theory, but the lack of quantitative measures of completeness has made direct empirical testing difficult. This paper helps fill this gap by proposing several measures of con- tractual detail using text based analysis. We analyze the default sections of a sample of private loan contracts, generating several measures of contract detail and of the use of common “boilerplate” language. Contracts are more complex when there is greater default risk, more uncertainty, and longer maturities, and an increased likelihood of renegotiation. Default language also shares greater similarities for larger contracts and contracts with more lenders, suggesting a role for standardization at the expense of complexity. We also find evidence that more complex loan contracts are associated with increases in operating performance suggesting that contractual completeness is associated with greater investment efficiency.
"Investment, Cash Flow, and the Structure of Corporate Debt Covenants" (with Richard Lowery)
We analyze the determinants of covenant structure in private debt contracts. While previous studies have demonstrated a relationship between firm characteristics and the overall strictness of loan contracts, few studies have examined why covenants are written on a range of accounting variables and what determines their selective use. Using a simple model of firm investment where firms face uncertain cash flows and investment opportunities, we characterize the conditions under which it is optimal for a debt contract to specify a restriction on investment or to specify a minimum cash flow realization. Consistent with this model, we find that the application of covenants based on these variables is not necessarily monotonic in firm risk. While the financially riskiest firms tend to employ capital expenditure covenants, cash flow and net worth covenants are most common among moderately risky firms with greater profitability and firms with stronger banking relationships. The results also highlight the importance of debt covenants in both mitigating agency frictions and maximizing the value of future private information.
This paper investigates how changes in a bank’s health impact real investment of its existing borrowers. Using a sample of U.S. firm bank relationships, I find that firms reduce investment by around 10% in response to a one standard deviation increase in the loan nonperformance of their primary bank. This effect is only present during active borrowing relationships, and is not driven by reverse causality or changes in region or industry specific investment opportunities. The effect weakens in the decade following the mid-90s but returns post 2006, suggesting that U.S. have not become less bank dependent
5 (M. Wardlaw → R. Lowery → J. Ledyard → R.McKelvey → C. Tovey → P. Erdős)